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Abstract 
In the context of an aging economy, the question addressed in this paper is: since pension systems 
differ in the funding methods - pay-as-you-go (PAYG) or fully funded - and payment schemes - 
Beveridgean or Bismarckian - under which setting can a sustainable public pension system provide 
both intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution, reduce labour supply distortion, and lead 
to a higher physical capital accumulation? Considering a series of partial reforms within a PAYG 
pension system to deal with aging, the results of our analysis show that commonly used policy 
actions distort labor supply and depress the capital market, thus, reducing the tax base and 
deteriorating the growth of the economy. As a consequence, the PAYG pension system does not 
appear to be reformable from inside, and a (partial) transition to a funded system is necessary. 
Moreover, we show that, within a fully funded scheme, a transition from a pure Beveridgean system 
to a pure Bismarckian system substantially improves the labor supply incentives, while it tends to 
depress physical capital accumulation. Hence, a mix between Beveridge and Bismarck substantiates 
a good compromise to balance the trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
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1 Introduction 
In face of demographic aging, the sustainability of pension systems has become the subject of 
a hot debate both in academia and in policy making. In general, countries implement systems 
consisting of three main pillars: the social security system, an occupational pension scheme, and a 
voluntary organized saving plan. The first pillar is mostly a PAYG system, while the last two are 
funded systems (see World Bank, 1994). As is well known, PAYG contributions are paid directly to 
the accounts of pensioners, while in a fully funded system, the contributions are invested in a fund. 
In addition to the distinction between PAYG and fully funded systems, pension schemes can differ 
in terms of the payments schemes: Beveridge or Bismarck. Beveridgean follows the flat benefit rule 
whereas Bismarckian the earning-related rule. The Beveridgean system is highly redistributive and 
achieves complete equalization of benefits, whereas no redistribution occurs in a pure Bismarckian 
system.5  
In most OECD countries, public pension systems are mainly financed via PAYG, which raises 
the question of their sustainability in face of aging. Given its current statutory rules and the aging 
demographic feature, such a pension system is not financially sustainable. 6 The aging population 
implies the countries with a PAYG pension system need a reform that either increases contributions 
or reduces benefits. Commonly used policy actions such as raising taxes can possibly reduce tax 
base and deteriorate the growth of the economy. There is no common opinion in literature on 
whether the PAYG system should be replaced with a funded system.7 Each theoretical or empirical 
model comes with a particular set of assumptions and motivations. Many studies have compared the 
present PAYG social security programs to fully or partially funded alternatives, showing their 
different implications for economic growth (see, e.g., Feldstein, 2005). From a theoretical 
perspective, consolidation or pre-funding can represent a solution to problems associated with the 
PAYG in aging societies.8 de la Croix et al. (2004) discuss the optimal allocation of resources 
                                                 
5 See more detailed descriptions regarding Beveridgean and Bismarckian systems in Cremer and Pestieau (2003), 
Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007), and Galasso and Profeta (2014). 
6 Based on the seminal papers from Samuelson (1958) and Aaron (1966), a PAYG pension system is financially 
sustainable in the long term if the product of the population growth rate and the growth rate of wages is higher than the 
return to capital. Other things being equal (migration, fertility, education…), in an ageing economy, the sustainability of 
pension systems is challenged for two reasons: on one hand, the ratio between the size of the working population 
contributing to the public pensions and the size of the pensioners’ population increases with time, hence, to maintain the 
pension systems one needs to raise the pension tax rate. On the other hand, this will reinforce the labor supply distortion 
of the working population, thus, reduce aggregate labor productivity.  
7 Discussion on the relative merits of funded and unfunded social security has rested on the scheme satisfying the so-
called “Aaron condition”, that a PAYG system is more welfare improving than a FF system if the growth rate of total 
wage income exceeds the interest rate. Note that the Aaron condition is not applicable when some variables are 
endogenous, see for instance Kolmar (1997) where fertility is endogenous. See also Sinn (2000) for a detailed review on 
the pros and cons of a funded pension system.  
8 The ageing demographic shift has been challenging the traditional PAYG public pension system in most OECD 
economies. The financial crisis has deteriorated the situation further. To accomplish budget targets, short term 
consolidations such as raising tax or cutting public consumption have been implemented. However, there is a trade-off 
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across generations under falling fertility. Andersen (2008) considers the effects of rising longevity 
on intergenerational distribution and risk sharing, calling for increasing retirement ages to adjust to 
longevity. Departing from much of the literature focusing solely on intergenerational redistribution, 
which considers mostly the optimal pension funding method, our approach provides both an inter- 
and intra-generational redistribution analysis for pension systems, considering different funding 
methods and payment schemes: the PAYG and fully funded (FF) systems, as well as the 
Beveridgean (flat benefit) and Bismarckian payment schemes (contribution related). 
A pension system introduces three main effects on the economy: a saving effect, a capital-
labor substitution effect, and a labor distortion effect. The saving effect is extensively investigated 
in the literature, while the other two effects are less studied. Our analysis hence focus both on labor 
distortion effects and growth effects when pension systems vary in funding methods and payment 
schemes.  
Public PAYG pension schemes have often been criticized as detrimental to growth given the 
standard argument that they reduce per capita income. Feldstein (1974) concludes that PAYG has a 
negative effect on capital accumulation since it discourages private savings. Within PAYG, 
payments go directly to the pensioners’ accounts, and, in an aging economy, the implicit rate of 
return on contributions to a PAYG scheme typically falls short of the interest rate. Hence, PAYG 
depresses wages and income growth due to the negative effect it produces on physical capital 
accumulation. Moreover, we argue that adding endogenous labor supply to the standard model 
dampens these forces. PAYG can distort labor/leisure decision due to the fact that in an aging 
economy the returns to PAYG contributions are typically lower than the returns to FF contributions, 
since the former depend mainly on demographic factors and on economic growth of individual 
wages whereas the latter depend on returns and assets on capital market.  
In addition, we consider another dimension of public pension systems, which is payment 
schemes: Beveridge or Bismarck. In an endogenous labour supply setting, Fenge (1995) and 
Brunner (1996) show that a shift to a pension system with a stronger contribution-benefit link 
(Bismarckian system) can reduce the labour-leisure distortion. However, their studies focus on 
Pareto efficiency and on welfare analysis instead of explaining the effects on economic growth in 
different systems.  
In the paper we focus also on the relationship between the features of pension systems and the 
process of physical capital formation.9 Our major theoretical predictions show that redistributive 
                                                                                                                                                                  
between the short-term and long-term effects of such temporary policy measures. Hence, alternative policy initiatives 
and reforms such as pre-funding or a partially transition to a funded system to ensure fiscal sustainability are urgent. 
Note that the transition to pre-funding usually also requires fiscal consolidation and debt, depending on available fiscal 
space. 
9 It is worth mentioning that there is another trend of literature which considers the effects of pension systems on human 
capital accumulation growth, as social security may also affect future productivity through education and fertility choice. 
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pension policies depress physical capital accumulation and economic growth. The underlying 
mechanism is that national welfare programs such as social security systems or public health care, 
embodying both intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution, crowd out private savings 
and national investment. Sinn (2000) concludes that a partial transition from the PAYG to a funded 
system may be a way to overcome the current demographic crisis, because it replaces missing 
human capital with real capital and helps smooth tax costs across generations. We reach a similar 
conclusion by considering only pure pension systems (PAYG or FF), but we expect the results to be 
applicable to mixed pension systems as well. Moreover, since a representative agent framework 
does not capture intragenerational distribution, we present a model with two productivity types. We 
show the significance of the distortion effects is further reinforced when intragenerational 
redistribution is considered. However, the Bismarckian system with a strong contribution-benefit 
link is not necessarily favoured over the Beveridgean system with flat benefits in terms of capital 
growth. The underlying mechanism explaining this preference is that lower indexation of pensions 
on contributions leads highly productive households to increase their savings whereas the less 
productive agents save less because they benefit from a more generous pension. Finally, based on 
our assumption of equal size of highly productive and less productive labour, the total effect is 
positive because the positive effects on saving from the productive households over-compensate the 
negative effects from the less productive households. Hence, we conclude that instead of focusing 
on intragenerational redistribution, pension reforms that reduce intergenerational redistribution can 
significantly boost economic growth and total production.  
Our model and simulations aim at analyzing both labor supply distortion and capital 
accumulation effects of pension systems that consist of intergenerational redistribution and 
intragenerational redistribution. Our results show that structural pension reforms such as 
transforming the PAYG systems to (partially) fully funded systems seem to be more efficient 
measures. This relates to the fact that funded system can substantially reduce labour supply 
distortions and lead to higher physical capital accumulation. The novelty of this paper lies in the 
demonstration that, while a transition from a pure Beveridgean system to a pure Bismarckian 
system substantially improves the labor supply incentive for the fully funded case, it may depress 
the physical capital accumulation. Hence, a funding system with a mix of the two payment schemes 
seems to be a good compromise to balance the trade-off between labor supply incentives and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
For instance, Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) and Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) study the role of education in the 
relationship between PAYG social security funding and economic growth. Docquier and Paddison (2003) and 
Lambrecht et al. (2005) compare the incentive for investment in education under PAYG and fully funded pension 
systems. In empirical literature, there are two opposing views regarding the relationship between redistributive 
expenditure and growth when one also considers human capital. Atkinson (1995) finds mixed empirical evidence on the 
sign of the correlation between social security and growth in OECD countries. Sala-i- Martin (1992) obtain a positive 
correlation between social security expenditure and cross-country growth by extending the analysis to a larger set of 
countries. 
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physical capital accumulation. Hachon (2010) reports the same finding for the PAYG system based 
on a model where the agent’s productivity is related to his life expectancy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model setting regarding the 
households maximization problem (Subsection 2.1), pension system features (Subsection 2.2) and 
production side (Subsection 2.3), respectively. Section 3 presents the closed economy general 
equilibrium framework used in this paper and the main analytical findings. Section 4 gives 
numerical simulation results confirming our findings in Section 3. The last section provides policy 
implications and concludes. 
2 The Model 
      The basic framework is an overlapping generations (OLG) model à la Diamond (1965). We 
consider a closed economy where firms produce a single homogenous good that can be used for 
both consumption and investment. The human and physical capital are used as inputs in a constant 
returns neoclassical technology. In a two-period OLG setting, we assume two types of individuals: 
low-skilled and high-skilled. Both PAYG and FF pension systems are considered, each in 
combination with two payment schemes: Beveridgean and Bismarckian. This section starts with 
Subsection 2.1 on households saving and labor supply decisions, followed by Subsection 2.2 with 
an analysis of government budget constraint with different pension systems in funding methods and 
payment schemes. Lastly in Subsection 2.3 the production function of the economy is presented. 
2.1 Households Decisions 
      Generations are non-altruistic, implying each old generation has no bequests motive. The 
economy consists of two types of individuals (𝑖): low-skilled (𝐿) and high-skilled (𝐻). People work 
in the first period of life and retire in the second period. Individuals differ in their endowment of 
human capital ℎ𝑖, where ℎ𝐿 < ℎ𝐻. The income level of an individual 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 in his working period 𝑡 is 
influenced by the wage level, his ability type and corresponding labor supply, i.e., 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡. 
Here 𝑤𝑡 is the wage rate per efficient unit of labor, while 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is the labor supply provided in the 
working period 𝑡 by an individual of type 𝑖 . Both types of individuals contribute to the public 
pension system when young and receive pension benefits when retired. The pension contribution 
rate is fixed and equal to 𝜏 where 0 < 𝜏 < 1. During the working period, individuals make labor 
supply and saving decisions. The size of the young working population in period  𝑡 is  𝑁𝑡, with the 
growth factor at time  𝑡 + 1  being denoted by 𝜌𝑡+1 , i.e., 
𝑁𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡
= 1 + 𝜌𝑡+1 . In the following we 
consider the case in which −1 < 𝜌𝑡+1 < 0, so the population is actually reducing from time 𝑡 to 
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time 𝑡 + 1, which satisfies our assumption of an aging economy. For simplicity, we assume the 
ratio between the number of low-skilled and the number of high-skilled workers in the economy to 
be constant over time and equal to 1. Therefore, both groups of workers are assumed to be of equal 
size  𝑁𝑡
2
 at each time.  
  The agents make decisions on saving and labor supply at the beginning of their first period. The 
preference of a type 𝑖 agent living at times 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 is described by the life-cycle utility reported 
below: 
                  𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑢(𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑖,𝑡2 ) + 𝛽 𝑢( 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1),                                               (1) 
 
 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ≤  (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡,                                              (2) 
 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑅𝑡+1𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1.                                                   (3) 
   
Preferences are defined by the utility function 𝑢 that is strictly increasing and strictly concave, 
which implies that, at optimality, the constraints given by Eq. (2) and (3) are satisfied with the 
equality. 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1 ≥ 0 denote the consumption levels during working and retired periods 
respectively, whereas 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0 is the labor supply provided in the working period. Note that the 
quadratic disutility of labor is not crucial for the qualitative nature of the results, however, the 
quasi-linear specification is crucial for our results as it assumes away income effects. 10  The 
parameter 𝛽  represents the preference for future consumption for each type of individuals. The 
young working generations allocate their after tax wage income (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡  between 
consumption 𝑐𝑖,𝑡  and savings 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 . The old retired generation receives returns on their previous 
savings 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 with a real interest rate 𝑟𝑡 and pension payments 𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1, which are dependent on the type. 
The agent’s before tax income depends both on his human capital endowment and labor supply. The 
budget constraints of type 𝑖 agents in their working and retired periods are represented by Eq. (2) 
and (3) respectively. For analytical tractability we consider the case of logarithmic utility afterwards. 
Consequently, the individual maximization problem can be written as: 
max
𝑙𝑖,𝑡,𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑐𝑖,𝑡,𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = ln(𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑖,𝑡
2 ) + 𝛽 ln 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1,                                     (4) 
 
  subject to the constraints expressed by Eq. (2) and (3). We assume when individuals make labor 
supply and saving decisions in period 𝑡, they anticipate some future variables and decisions. In 
other words,  𝑅𝑡+1  and 𝑤𝑡  are treated as exogenous and perfectly known variables during each 
individual maximization, whereas the dependence of 𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 on the decision variable 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 varies based 
on different pension systems and payment schemes. Concluding, an individual of type 𝑖 born in 
                                                 
10 In this setting, leisure is not taken into account as a normal good. See, e.g., Sommacal (2006) for a detailed discussion of the role 
of labor supply in evaluating the redistributive impact of a pension system with different utility functions. 
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period 𝑡 is endowed with ℎ𝑖 units of human capital and chooses 𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1 to maximize his 
life-cycle utility expressed by Eq. (1) under the constraints given by Eq. (2), (3). Expressing 𝑐𝑖,𝑡  
and 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1  as functions of  𝑙𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 by exploiting such two constraints and assuming an interior 
solution for the resulting unconstrained optimization problem, one obtains the following necessary 
and sufficient first-order optimality conditions: 
𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= −1
𝑐𝑖,𝑡−
𝑙𝑖,𝑡
2
2
+ 𝛽 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1
= 0,                                            (5) 
𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑅𝑡+1[(1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 − 𝑙𝑖,𝑡] +
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
= 0.                          (6) 
      Taking the other variables such as pension payments 𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1, wage level 𝑤𝑡 and interest rate 𝑟𝑡+1 
as given, we derive the saving level 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 and individual labor supply 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 for a type 𝑖 agent born in 
period  𝑡 as reported below: 
𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =
𝛽(1−𝜏)𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡−
𝛽𝑙𝑖,𝑡
2
2
−
𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
1+𝛽
,                                         (7) 
𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 +
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝑡+1
.                                                 (8)
 
      We assume saving decisions 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 can be negative, due to the fact that retirees receive a pension 
payment out of which they can fulfill their credit obligations. Both the decisions for 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 and the 
decisions for labor supply 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 depend on the funding methods and the pension payments scheme 
(e.g., through the terms 𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 and 
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
, which will be discussed in detail in Section 3). We first 
present the pension payment rules in both PAYG and FF systems in the next subsection, separately. 
 
2.2 Pension Systems and Public Budget Constraint 
Beveridgean Scheme 
      In a Beveridgean pension scheme, the pension payments are universal among the population. 
Regardless the productivity type, each individual born at time 𝑡 receives the same pension benefits 
when retired at time 𝑡 + 1. In other words, the pension benefits one receives are not related to the 
contributions one made when young. We use “ Bev ” as the index for a Beveridgean pension scheme. 
Concluding, the pension benefits rule for the low-skilled and high-skilled workers is written as: 
𝑝𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = 𝑝𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺.                                                             (9) 
Bismarckian Scheme 
      Instead, in a Bismarckian scheme, the pension benefits are contribution-related. Those who 
contribute more to the pension system during the working period receive more when retired. 
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Therefore, a Bismarckian scheme produces no intra-generational transfer. We use “ Bis ” as the 
index for a Bismarckian pension scheme. The Bismarckian pension payments rule for the low-
skilled and high-skilled workers therefore becomes: 
𝑝𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑝𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺.                                                        (10) 
 
PAYG  
      In PAYG system, government collects partially the wage income of the young working 
generation to pay for the pension benefits of the currently old retired generation. The key character 
of a PAYG system is that the contribution collected by the government goes directly to the 
pensioners’ accounts, without being used as physical capital in the production or investment process. 
Therefore, we observe directly redistribution from the young to the old generations. And a PAYG 
pension system is dependent on demographic factors. We can express accordingly the government 
budget constraint of a PAYG pension system as follows: 
𝑝𝐿,𝑡+1𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + 𝑝𝐻,𝑡+1𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = 𝜏𝑤𝑡+1𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 )(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1).                (11) 
      Accordingly, the pension benefits for a type 𝑖 agent under the two different payment schemes 
for the PAYG pension systems are expressed as follows: 
Beveridgean PAYG  
𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝜏𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺+ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)(1+𝜌𝑡+1)
2
.                         (12) 
Bismarckian PAYG  
𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = 𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝛺𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 .                       (13) 
  where 𝛺𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 denotes the growth factor of the economy’s per capita income at time 𝑡 + 1, 
which is defined as 
 𝛺𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺+ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺+ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
.                              (14) 
 
Fully Funded (FF) 
      While the PAYG system directly transfers the young generation’s contribution to the old 
generation, the FF system collects the contribution and invests in the production process. Therefore, 
the pension benefits in the FF system are defined differently. The government budget constraint of 
the FF pension system follows the equation reported below: 
𝑝𝐿,𝑡+1𝐹𝐹 + 𝑝𝐻,𝑡+1𝐹𝐹 = 𝑅𝑡+1𝐹𝐹 𝜏𝑤𝑡𝐹𝐹(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡𝐹𝐹 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡𝐹𝐹 ).                                          (15) 
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      Accordingly, the FF system shows a link between individual contributions when young and 
pension benefits when retired. Hence we can express as follows the pension benefits of a type 𝑖 
agent under the two different payment schemes in the FF system. 
Beveridgean FF  
𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 =
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹+ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
.                                   (16) 
Bismarckian FF  
  𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 .                                             (17) 
2.3 Production  
  Firms produce a single homogeneous good according to a Cobb-Douglas technology exhibiting 
constant returns to scale. The outputs and factor markets are competitive, in which the equilibrium 
factor prices correspond to marginal products of inputs. The production function 𝐹 of the 
representative firm is: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡),                                                            (18) 
  where 𝑌𝑡 is the output at time 𝑡, which can be either consumed or saved as new physical capital. 
We assume capital is totally depreciated in each term. 𝐿𝑡 is the aggregate labor input,  𝐾𝑡 is the 
physical capital. 𝑅𝑡  stands for the market rental rate on capital in period 𝑡  and 𝑤𝑡  is the 
corresponding wage rate. The representative firm maximizes in each period its profit function, 
solving the following optimization problem, taking 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡) = 𝐴𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐿𝑡1−𝛼: 
max
𝐾𝑡,𝐿𝑡
 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡) − 𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡𝐾𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐿𝑡1−𝛼 − 𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡𝐾𝑡.                                 (19) 
  It follows by the first-order optimality condition that profit maximization equates the real 
interest rate and the real wage rate to the marginal product of capital and labor, respectively. 
Combining the representative firm’s profit maximizing condition and the equilibrium condition in 
the labor market yields:  
𝑤𝑡 = 𝐴(1 − 𝛼)𝑘𝑡𝛼,                                                   (20) 
 
𝑅𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡) = 𝐴𝛼𝑘𝑡𝛼−1.                                                       (21) 
      The labor market clearing condition yields: 
𝐿𝑡 =
𝑁𝑡
2
(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡).                                                      (22) 
      We denote by 𝑘𝑡 =
𝐾𝑡
𝐿𝑡
 the physical to human capital ratio (capital in efficiency units), which we 
can express as: 
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  𝑘𝑡 =
𝐾𝑡
𝐿𝑡
= 𝐾𝑡𝑁𝑡
2
(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡)
.                                          (23) 
3 General Equilibrium  
    This section provides the full solution of the individual maximization problem described by Eq. 
(2)-(4) taking into consideration the factor markets and government budget constraints. In 
equilibrium, the aggregate amount of pension payments must equal the aggregate contribution.  
 
Definition 1. Given the state of agents distribution in the economy and the level of low-skilled and 
high-skilled human capital, a dynamic equilibrium is a sequence of individual’s decisions, a 
sequence of factor prices, and a sequence of pension payments so that:11 
(i) Individuals choose  𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1 to solve the maximization problem described by Eq. 
(2)-(4), taking the factor prices as given; 
(ii) Factor markets clearing condition holds: the factor prices are equal to their marginal 
products, see Eq. (20) and (21); 
(iii) The government budget constraint is satisfied, i.e., Eq. (11) is satisfied in a PAYG system, 
while Eq. (15) is satisfied in a FF system. The above conditions also account for a 
sustainable equilibrium.  
 
      More specifically, a dynamic equilibrium is characterized by the following features in each 
period 𝑡. 
 
— Factor Market Equilibrium  
Equality between demand and supply of labor and capital 
 
      In the labor market equilibrium, the aggregate labor supply in period 𝑡 is the sum of the labor 
supply from both the high-skilled and low-skilled workers, see Eq. (22).  
      The capital market is fully integrated in the economy. In a PAYG pension system, the supply of 
capital in period 𝑡 + 1 is determined by the saving decision of the young made in period 𝑡. In a FF 
pension scheme, the supply of capital in period 𝑡 + 1 is made up of both private and public savings 
                                                 
11 For simplicity, we take the pension tax rate as an exogenous variable.  
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of period  𝑡.12 Hence in a PAYG pension system, the physical capital 𝐾𝑡+1𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 in period  𝑡 + 1  is the 
sum of the aggregate previous period private savings 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑁𝑡
2
(𝑠𝐿,𝑡 + 𝑠𝐻,𝑡),                                                         (24) 
      where 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is provided by Eq. (7). Therefore, the PAYG capital market equilibrium condition is:  
𝐾𝑡+1𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = ∑
𝑁𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
2𝑖=𝐿,𝐻
.                                                      (25) 
      On the other hand, in the FF pension system, the aggregate physical capital consists both of 
private savings and public savings. Accordingly, the aggregate capital in a FF pension system is:  
𝐾𝑡+1𝐹𝐹 = ∑
𝑁𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝐹+𝑁𝑡𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝐹
2𝑖=𝐿,𝐻
.                                           (26) 
      
For the PAYG pension system, one can determine the capital stock 𝐾𝑡+1𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺  from Eq. (25), 
knowing the values assumed by the variables 𝑁𝑡 and 𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺. Similarly, for the FF pension system, 
one can determine the capital stock 𝐾𝑡+1𝐹𝐹  from Eq. (26), knowing the values assumed by the 
variables 𝑁𝑡, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝐹𝐹, 𝑤𝑡𝐹𝐹, ℎ𝑖. Individuals choose 𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1 to solve the maximization problem 
(1)-(3), taking the factor prices as given.  
 
Factor Prices 
      The factor market equilibrium requires Eq. (20) and (21) to be satisfied. 
— Individual Utility Maximization 
      A general expression for the saving decision 𝑠𝑖,𝑡  is provided by Eq. (7). Likewise the labor 
supply decision, it depends on the particular funding method and payment scheme. In the next 
section, we focus on the labor supply 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 for the type 𝑖 agent in the following four pension systems: 
Beveridgean PAYG system, Bismarckian PAYG system, Beveridgean FF system, and Bismarckian 
FF system. 
 
3.1 The Labor Supply 
      In the following, we express the optimal individual labor supply with respect to the four 
different pension systems. In the Bismarckian system, pensions are assessed on the basis of past 
earnings. Greater work effort by the young raises not only their current income but also leads to 
higher pension benefits when retired. Instead, the Beveridgean system implies a flat benefit scheme 
                                                 
12 See Eq. (11) and (15). 
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where the benefits are universal among individuals with different productivities. On the other hand, 
the PAYG pension system indicates that the pension payments for the old generation are paid 
through labor taxation on the current young generation. In a fully funded pension system, the 
pension payments are based on the market return of the private pension fund accounts, which means 
that one’s pension benefits in his second period of life are related on his first period own 
contribution. Therefore, the labor distortion effects vary with the nature of the four different pension 
systems. Here, we report the labor supply 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 for each pension system. Details on the derivations of 
such results are given in the appendix.  
Beveridgean PAYG 
𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝑖.                                              (27) 
Bismarckian PAYG 
𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝑖 +
(1−𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝑖𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺+ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺+ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 .                   (28) 
Beveridgean FF 
𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖.                                                (29) 
Bismarckian FF 
𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = 𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖.                                                           (30) 
  
One can notice that the ratio between the labor supply choices of the high-skilled and low-
skilled individuals is equal to ℎ𝐻
ℎ𝐿
 . As it is shown in the appendix, for each of the four pension 
systems considered in the paper, when we consider constant population growth rate where 𝜌𝑡+1 is 
equal to a constant 𝜌, one obtains a unique nontrivial steady state solution (i.e., one characterized by 
non-zero values of the labor supply decisions, and of the capital in efficiency units). Hence, we 
provide the following expressions for the steady state values of the labor supply decisions of both 
types of individuals.13 
Beveridgean PAYG 
𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺  = (1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1−𝛼)(1−𝜏)
2[𝛼(1+𝛽)+𝜏(1−𝛼)](1+𝜌)
]
𝛼 
1−𝛼 ℎ𝑖.                    (31) 
Bismarckian PAYG 
 𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = (1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)
𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
 
                                ×  [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1−𝛼)(1−𝜏)
[2𝛼(1+𝛽)+𝜏(1−𝛼)(2+𝛽)](1+𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼 ℎ𝑖.                                                (32) 
Beveridgean FF 
                                                 
13 See the derivations in the appendix.  
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𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [𝐴𝛽
(1−𝛼)(1+𝜏)
2(1+𝛽)(1+𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼 ℎ𝑖.                         (33) 
Bismarckian FF 
𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [ 𝐴𝛽
(1−𝛼)
2(1+𝛽)(1+𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼 ℎ𝑖.                                (34) 
 
Proposition 1: Assume that 𝑈(𝑥) = ln 𝑥. In a closed country OLG model, when we consider an 
aging economy,  
(i) in the FF case, assuming  𝛼 ≤ 1
2
, the degree of labor supply distortion at the steady state is 
always higher under the Bismarckian payment scheme than under the Beveridgean payment 
scheme;  
(ii) for each type of individuals, the partial derivative of the steady state labor supply with respect 
to 𝜌  is negative in all pension systems, whereas its partial derivative with respect to 𝜏  is 
negative for the Beveridgean PAYG system, and is equal to 0 for the Bismarckian FF system. 
 
Proof. (i) A comparison of Eq. (33) and (34) shows that 
𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹,                                                       (35) 
provided 𝛼 ≤ 1
2
. Indeed, in that case, one has  
(1 − 𝜏)(1 + 𝜏)𝛼/(1−𝛼) = (1 − 𝜏2)(1 + 𝜏)(2𝛼−1)/(1−𝛼) ≤ 1.              (36) 
      (ii) Closed-form expressions of all the partial derivatives (from which one concludes about their 
signs) are reported in the appendix. We summarize the results in Table 1. We use the symbol “?” to 
denote that the sign of the partial derivative depends on the choice of the parameters. 
 
 Beveridgean PAYG Bismarckian PAYG Beveridgean FF Bismarckian FF 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝜕𝜌
 
− − − − 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝜕𝜏
 − ? ? 0 
 
Table 1: the signs of the partial derivatives of the steady state labor supply with respect to ρ and τ. 
 
One can observe that Proposition 1 (ii) does not report the sign of the partial derivative of the 
steady state labor supply with respect to 𝜏 for the Beveridgean FF system and the Bismarckian 
PAYG system, as it can be either positive or negative, depending on the choices of the parameters. 
One can also notice that, even in the FF case, the product 𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 is not necessarily higher in the 
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Bismarckian pension system than in the Beveridgean pension system, given that the wage rates in 
the two systems are different at equilibrium. Hence, we show and compare the steady state labor 
supply in the numerical simulations section. 
An analytical comparison of all cases described by Eq. (31)-(34) is not straightforward. 
However, a numerical investigation of Eq. (31)-(34) for realistic values of their parameters is done 
in Section 4, and shows that the statement of Proposition 1 (𝑖) holds also for the PAYG system, for 
such choices of the parameters. One can also notice that the result of such a comparison depends 
essentially on the parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝜏, since Eq. (31)-(34) depend in the same ways on 𝐴 and 𝜌. 
Finally, it is interesting to observe that, for the Bismarckian FF pension system, there is no 
dependence from 𝜏 of the steady state values of the low-skilled and high-skilled individual labor 
supply choices. Such a system has no labor supply distortion. 
3.2 Capital Accumulation Levels in Efficiency Units 
Following the equilibrium capital market conditions given before for both the PAYG and FF 
systems [see Eq. (22) and (23)], using the saving 𝒔𝒊,𝒕 from Eq. (7) and the pension schemes given by 
Eq. (11), (12), (14), (15), we can express as follows the capital in efficiency units under the four 
different pension schemes. Details on the derivations of such results are given in the appendix. 
Beveridgean PAYG 
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1−𝛼)(1−𝜏)
2[𝛼(1+𝛽)+𝜏(1−𝛼)](1+𝜌𝑡+1)
]
1
1+𝛼 (𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
1+𝛼 .                    (39) 
 
Bismarckian PAYG 
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽(1−𝛼)(1−𝜏)
[2𝛼(1+𝛽)+𝜏(1−𝛼)(2+𝛽)](1+𝜌𝑡+1)
]
1
1+𝛼    (𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
1+𝛼.                 (40) 
 
Beveridgean FF 
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 = [ 𝐴𝛽(1−𝛼)(1+𝜏)
2(1+𝛽)(1+𝜌𝑡+1)
]
1
1+𝛼 (𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2𝛼
1+𝛼.                                 (41) 
Bismarckian FF 
        𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = [ 𝐴𝛽(1−𝛼)
2(1+𝛽)(1+𝜌𝑡+1)
]
1
1+𝛼 (𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2𝛼
1+𝛼.                                   (42) 
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3.3 Steady State Capital Stock in Efficiency Units 
In this section we address the implications of the four different pension systems on the steady 
state capital stock. The steady state capital stock in efficiency units for the four different pension 
systems is obtained from Eq. (43)-(46).14 
 
Beveridgean PAYG 
𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽(1−𝛼)(1−𝜏)
2[𝛼(1+𝛽)+𝜏(1−𝛼)](1+𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼 .                                   (43) 
 
Bismarckian PAYG 
𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽(1−𝛼)(1−𝜏)
[2𝛼(1+𝛽)+𝜏(1−𝛼)(2+𝛽)](1+𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼.                                 (44) 
Beveridgean FF 
𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 = [𝐴𝛽(1−𝛼)(1+𝜏)
2(1+𝛽)(1+𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼.                                                   (45) 
Bismarckian FF 
𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = [ 𝐴𝛽(1−𝛼)
2(1+𝛽)(1+𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼.                                                     (46) 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that 𝑈(𝑥) = ln 𝑥.  In a closed economy OLG model, when we consider an 
aging economy,  
(i) the steady state value of the capital stock in efficiency units is always higher in the FF pension 
systems than in the PAYG systems. Moreover, under the same funding method, the steady state 
capital stock under the Beveridgean payment scheme is higher than under the Bismarckian 
payment scheme; 
(ii) the partial derivative of the steady state value of the capital stock in efficiency units with respect 
to 𝜌  is negative in all pension systems, whereas its partial derivative with respect to 𝜏  is 
negative for the two PAYG systems, equal to 0 for the Bismarckian FF system, and positive for 
the Beveridgean FF system.  
Proof. (i) A direct comparison of Eq. (43)-(46) shows that 
𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 ≤ 𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 ≤ 𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹,                                (47) 
for all the possible choices of the parameters.  
                                                 
14 Details are provided in the appendix. 
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(ii) Closed-form expressions of all the other partial derivatives (from which one concludes about 
their signs) are reported in the appendix. We summarize the results in Table 2.  
 
 Beveridgean PAYG Bismarckian PAYG Beveridgean FF Bismarckian FF 
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝜌
 
− − − − 
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝜏
 − − 
 + 0 
              
Table 2: the signs of the partial derivatives of the steady state value of the capital stock in 
efficiency units with respect to ρ and τ. 
In the appendix, it is also shown that all the nontrivial steady state solutions (43)-(46) are 
globally asymptotically stable. This motivates the importance of such solutions for our analysis. 
4 Numerical Simulations 
In this section, we show numerically how the steady state labor supply and the steady state 
capital stock in efficient units changes with respect to the population growth rate and the labour tax 
rate for the four different pension systems. In short, the numerical simulations support the 
theoretical findings in proposition 1 and 2. Moreover, since the sign of the partial derivative of labor 
supply with respect to 𝜏 is ambiguous for the Beveridgean FF and Bismarckian PAYG cases, we 
test, numerically, the signs for these two cases. The main results are reported in proposition 3.  
Figure 1 shows, for all the four pension systems, the nontrivial steady state values for the low-
skilled individual labor supply choice and the high-skilled individual labor supply choice, expressed 
as functions of the parameters 𝜌 and 𝜏, for fixed values of the other parameters  α, 𝛽, 𝐴, ℎ𝐿, and ℎ𝐻 
(the choices 𝛽 = 0.96, α = 0.29, 𝐴 = 8, ℎ𝐿 = 0.5, ℎ𝐻 = 1 have been made to generate the figure)15. 
The parameters 𝜌 and 𝜏 range, respectively, on the intervals [−0.5, 0) and [0.2, 0.5]. In particular, 
the figure shows that - the other things being equal - the nontrivial steady state values obtained in 
the case of the fully funded methods for the low-skilled individual labor supply choice and the high-
skilled individual labor supply choice, are always larger than the corresponding ones obtained in the 
case of the PAYG methods. Figure 2 does a similar comparison for the capital in efficiency units. 
 
                                                 
15 The values of these variables follow Bouzahzaha, de la Croix and Docquier (2002). 
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Figure 1. Nontrivial steady state values for the low-skilled (left) and high-skilled (right) individual 
labor supply choice for all the four pension systems studied in the paper, as functions of the 
parameters 𝜌 and 𝜏, for fixed values of the other parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝐴, ℎ𝐿, and ℎ𝐻. 
 
Figure 2. Nontrivial steady state values for the capital in efficiency units for all the four pension 
systems studied in the paper, as functions of the parameters 𝜌 and 𝜏, for fixed values of the other 
parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝐴, ℎ𝐿, and ℎ𝐻. 
 
      It is also interesting to compare the steady state solutions obtained for the four pension systems 
in terms of the capital per person, defined as 
𝐾𝑡
𝑁𝑡
= ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
2
𝑘𝑡 ,        (50) 
which we evaluate, again, at the steady state values for 𝑙𝐿,𝑡, 𝑙𝐻,𝑡, and 𝑘𝑡. Figure 3 shows the results 
of this comparison, for the same values of the parameters as in Figure 1. We can see that, for the 
selected parameters, the steady state values of the capital per person for the FF pension systems are 
larger than the ones obtained for the PAYG pension systems. 
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Figure 3. Nontrivial steady state values for the capital per person for all the four pension systems 
studied in the paper, as functions of the parameters 𝜌 and 𝜏, for fixed values of the other parameters 
𝛼, 𝛽, 𝐴, ℎ𝐿, and ℎ𝐻. 
 
      Finally, Figures 4, 5, and 6 show, respectively, the portions of the plots in Figures 1, 2, and 3 
that are obtained by setting the parameter 𝜌 to −0.3. 
 
Figure 4. Nontrivial steady state values for the low-skilled (left) and high-skilled (right) individual 
labor supply choice for all the four pension systems studied in the paper, as functions of the 
parameter 𝜏, for fixed values of the other parameters  𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝐴, ℎ𝐿, and ℎ𝐻. 
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Figure 5. Nontrivial steady state values for the capital in efficiency units for all the four pension 
systems studied in the paper, as functions of the parameter 𝜏 , for fixed values of the other 
parameters  𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝐴, ℎ𝐿, and ℎ𝐻. 
 
      We can summarize the results of the numerical comparison done in this section in the following 
proposition, whose proof is evident from the plots in Figures 1-3. 
 
Proposition 3: Assume that 𝑈(𝑥) = ln 𝑥. In a closed country OLG model, when we consider an 
aging economy, under the realistic choices of the parameters considered in this section,16 
(i) the degree of labor supply distortion at the steady state is always higher for the PAYG case than 
for the FF case; for both the PAYG and FF cases, the degree of labor supply distortion at the 
steady state is always higher for the Bismarckian pension system than for the Beveridgean 
pension system; 
(ii) for each type of individuals, the partial derivative of the steady state labor supply with respect 
to 𝜌  is negative in all pension systems, whereas its partial derivative with respect to 𝜏  is 
negative for both the PAYG systems and the Beveridgean FF system, and is equal to 0 for the 
Bismarckian FF system; 
(iii)the steady state values of the capital stock in efficiency units and the capital per person are 
always higher in the FF pension systems than in the PAYG systems. Moreover, under the same 
funding method, such steady state values are higher under the Beveridgean payment scheme 
than under the Bismarckian payment scheme; 
                                                 
16 I.e., 𝛽 = 0.96, α = 0.29, 𝐴 = 8, ℎ𝐿 = 0.5, ℎ𝐻 = 1, whereas the parameters 𝜌 and 𝜏 range, respectively, on the 
intervals [−0.5, 0) and [0.2, 0.5]. 
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(iv) the partial derivative of the steady state value of the capital stock in efficiency units with respect 
to 𝜌  is negative in all pension systems, whereas its partial derivative with respect to 𝜏  is 
negative for the two PAYG systems, equal to 0 for the Bismarckian FF system, and positive for 
the Beveridgean FF system. 
 
 Beveridgean PAYG Bismarckian PAYG Beveridgean FF Bismarckian FF 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝜕𝜌
 
− − − − 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝜕𝜏
 − − − 0 
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝜌
 − − − − 
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝜏
 − −  + 0 
 
Table 3: For 𝛽 = 0.96, α = 0.29, 𝐴 = 8, ℎ𝐿 = 0.5, ℎ𝐻 = 1, 𝜌 ∈  [−0.5, 0), and 𝜏 ∈ [0.2, 0.5]: the 
signs of the partial derivatives of the steady state values of the labor supply and the capital stock in 
efficiency units with respect to ρ and τ. 
 
To conclude, the simulation results summarized in Proposition 3 are consistent with the findings 
we provided in Section 3. For realistic values of the parameters considered in our numerical 
comparison, we can firstly conclude that the labor supply distortion increases when the pension tax 
rate is higher for all the cases except for the Bismarckian FF case, where the labor supply distortion 
is always zero. Moreover, a transition from a PAYG to a (partially) fully funded system 
substantially decreases the labor supply distortion. At the same time, a reform towards a 
Bismarckian system with a stronger contribution-benefit link reduces labor supply but not 
necessarily boosts capital stock.  
5 Policy Implications and Conclusion 
      Reforms of the current public pension systems are continuously in hot debate in the main OECD 
countries, where the population is aging. Empirical evidence from 20 OECD countries shows that 
the overall size of the pension program increases due to the size of the ratio of the aged (over 60) to 
the middle aged (40-60). In particular, in most European countries, such as Italy and Germany, 
where the fertility rate is lower than the replacement level, the present PAYG financing of public 
pension system burden on active cohorts and cannot provide an adequate level of pension benefits 
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for future cohort of pensioners. Therefore it is believed, both in academia and in policy, that 
substantial reforms are urgent due to the fact that the system is on the verge of collapse.17 
      This paper considers a general equilibrium model in a closed economy with an aging population. 
We are interested in investigating labor supply distortion effects and economic growth effects with 
respect to different funding methods and payment schemes of the pension system.  
     It is well known that, in an aging economy, a fully funded system boosts higher physical capital 
accumulation and therefore leads to higher economic growth.18 The results from this paper show the 
same conclusion as a fully funded system leads to higher capital accumulation. When we consider 
the closed economy equilibrium, higher capital accumulation results in higher wages, but lower 
rates of return on capital. Moreover, we are not only interested in the effects of different pension 
systems on savings, but also on labor supply. We investigate an endogenous decision for labor 
supply based on four pension systems that differ in two dimensions: the funding system and the 
payment scheme. Under both PAYG and fully funded systems, labor supply is less distorted when 
the pension payment scheme is Bismarckian. In fact, labor supply is not distorted at all in the 
Bismarckian fully funded pension system. The model also shows in Figure 4 that labor supply of 
the high-skilled workers is more distorted than that of the low-skilled workers due to the fact that 
the high-skilled workers are endowed with higher human capital.  
      One aim of enacting social security reforms is to raise national savings. An argument often 
made in favor of funded systems is that they would accumulate a higher increase in national savings 
than the one that would occur with the PAYG financing channel. The effects of a reform plan on 
capital accumulation are usually evaluated based on the individuals’ saving decisions and national 
saving account, which involves the direct effects on saving from change to benefits and revenue, 
and the indirect effects that are more complicated. For instance, the individuals may raise or reduce 
private savings in response to a reform. Given that we consider labor-leisure distortion effects, a 
reform may not only have impact on the individuals’ saving decisions per se, but also influence the 
total wage income that indirectly offsets private savings. We show that in the demographic trend of 
aging, commonly used policy actions, such as raising tax rates distort labor supply and the capital 
market, reduce the tax base, and deteriorate the growth of the economy. Instead, structural pension 
reforms such as transforming PAYG systems to (partially) fully funded systems can substantially 
reduce labor supply distortion and boost capital accumulation. On the other hand, our model shows 
that even though a reform from a pure Beveridgean system to a pure Bismarckian system 
substantially improves the labor supply incentives, it tends to depress physical capital accumulation. 
Hence, we show why a funding system with a mix of the two payment schemes is a good 
                                                 
17 See for instance, Kotlikoff (2013) that provides policy analysis for US. 
18 See in a similar framework, Docquier and Paddison (2003) shows that growth can only be stimulated under a fully funded scheme 
based on a Bismarckian regime depending on one’s partial earnings history. 
 22 
compromise to balance the trade-off between labor supply incentive and physical capital 
accumulation.  
      Note that our results are based on theoretical predictions and are purely descriptive. However, 
our results can still shed some light on PAYG pension reform discussions Since the seminar 
contribution from World Bank (1994) that proposed a multi-pillar pension scheme where publicly 
managed, unfunded defined-benefit (DB) schemes are shifted to privately managed, fully funded 
defined-contribution (DC) schemes, many countries caught on this policy vision: between 1988 and 
2008, 29 countries introduced systemic reforms involving the establishment of a main funded 
pension pillar but with variations in design, implementation, and outcome (see for instance recent 
discussions of Feldstein, 2005). Taking Germany as an example, the 2001 major reform bill shifted 
the pure PAYG system to a multi-pillar pension system with a small but growing pre-funded pillar. 
In 2004, another reform transformed the PAYG pillar into a notional defined contribution (NDC) by 
introducing a sustainability factor into the benefit indexation formula and recommended an increase 
in the normal retirement age (See Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2004). The main contribution of our 
paper is to propose a private fully funded system with a mix of Beveridge and Bismarck, solving the 
equity-efficiency tradeoff problem. Our main concern is that, a fully transition to a funded system is 
hard to implement due to economic and politic challenges. Not to mention that the private market 
fails to provide the basic Beveridgean pension because private market cannot redistribution. 
Therefore, a possible solution is to follow the german practice, distribute the first basic flat pension 
via public programs and manage the second private pension funds via financial intermediaries. 
      Finally, it is worth mentioning that the effects of the pension system on human capital 
accumulation were not analyzed in our model and deserve further investigation. A possible 
extension would be to introduce education as a determinant of productivity. In theory, the negative 
effects of redistributive pension policies on growth should be amplified vis-à-vis what we have 
already shown in our analysis. So our results will hold, a fortiori, when we consider human capital 
accumulation, since low saving rates provide poor pools of capital for investment in education for 
young generation if private education were not taken into consideration. 
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Appendix 
 
      In this appendix, we derive recursive formulas for the capital in efficiency units, for all the 
pension systems investigated in the paper. We also provide the expressions of their nontrivial steady 
state values, which are obtained from such recursive formulas, together with the expressions of the 
nontrivial steady state values for the labor supply decisions and for the capital per person. 
 
Beveridgean PAYG System 
 
      Combining Eq. (8) and (12), one obtains 
 𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝑖. (A1) 
      This, combined with Eq. (7) and (12) again, provides 
 
𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
ℎ𝑖
2
1 + 𝛽
−
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
ℎ𝑖
2
2(1 + 𝛽)
−
𝜏𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
2𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 + 𝛽)
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
ℎ𝑖
2
2(1 + 𝛽)
−
𝜏𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
𝑁𝑡+1(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
2(1 + 𝛽)𝑁𝑡+1𝐴𝛼(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼−1
 
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
ℎ𝑖
2
2(1 + 𝛽)
−
𝜏(1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
(1 + 𝛽)𝑁𝑡+1𝛼
𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
ℎ𝑖
2
2(1 + 𝛽)
−
𝜏(1 − 𝛼)𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼(1 + 𝛽)𝑁𝑡 
. 
(A2) 
 
      Then, using Eq. (24), (22), and (23), one gets 
 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = 𝑁𝑡
2
∑ 𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑖=𝐿,𝐻 =
𝑁𝑡𝛽(1−𝜏)2(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
(ℎ𝐿
2+ℎ𝐻
2 )
4(1+𝛽)
− 𝜏
(1−𝛼)𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼(1+𝛽)
, (A3) 
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𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝛼𝑁𝑡𝛽(1−𝜏)2(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
(ℎ𝐿
2+ℎ𝐻
2 )
4[𝛼(1+𝛽)+𝜏(1−𝛼)]
, (A4) 
 
𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = 𝑁𝑡+1
2
𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 ), (A5) 
 
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =  
𝛼𝑁𝑡𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 )
4[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)]
𝑁𝑡+1
2 𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ𝐿
2 + ℎ𝐻
2 )
=
𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝜏)(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
=
𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝐴2(1 − 𝛼)2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
=
𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼. 
(A6) 
Recursive formula for the capital in efficiency units: 
 𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
]
1
1+𝛼
(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
1+𝛼.    (A7) 
Unique nontrivial steady state solution (when 𝜌𝑡 = 𝜌): 
 𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼
. (A8) 
 𝑙𝐿
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺  = (1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)
]
𝛼 
1−𝛼
ℎ𝐿. (A9) 
 𝑙𝐻
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺  = (1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)
]
𝛼 
1−𝛼
ℎ𝐻. (A10) 
 𝐾𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑁𝑡
=
ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2
2
(1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)
]
1 
1−𝛼
. (A11) 
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      Using Eq. (14), one obtains 
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 𝛺𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
=
𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝐿𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺. (A12) 
      This, combined with Eq. (21), provides 
 
𝛺𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝐿𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
=
𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝐿𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝐴𝛼(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼−1
=
(1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝛼𝐿𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺. 
(A13) 
      Then, using Eq. (8) and (13), one obtains 
 
𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝑖 + 𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝑖(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
𝛺𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
= (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝑖
+ 𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝑖(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
(1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝛼𝐿𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
= (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝑖 +
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝑖𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼𝐿𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
= (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝑖
+
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝑖𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
𝜆𝐿ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + 𝜆𝐻ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜆𝐿ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + 𝜆𝐻ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺. 
(A14) 
      Hence, when 𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝐻, respectively, one gets 
 𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝐿 +
(1−𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
𝜆𝐿ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺+𝜆𝐻ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜆𝐿ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺+𝜆𝐻ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺, (A15) 
 𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝐻 +
(1−𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
𝜆𝐿ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺+𝜆𝐻ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜆𝐿ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺+𝜆𝐻ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺. (A16) 
      Multiplying Eq. (A15) and (A16) by ℎ𝐻  and ℎ𝐿 , respectively, and taking the difference, one 
obtains 
 𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝐻 − 𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 ℎ𝐿 = 0, (A17) 
      so 
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 𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = ℎ𝐻
ℎ𝐿
 𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺, (A18) 
 𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
ℎ𝐻
ℎ𝐿
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺. (A19) 
      Hence, Eq. (A15) simplifies to 
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝐿
+
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
𝜆𝐿ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + 𝜆𝐻ℎ𝐻2 /ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜆𝐿ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + 𝜆𝐻ℎ𝐻
2 /ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
= (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺ℎ𝐿 +
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 
= (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
+
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 . 
(A20) 
      Multiplying the two sides of Eq. (A20) by 𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 , one obtains 
 
(𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
  − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
−
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = 0. 
(A21) 
      This is a second-order algebraic equation with discriminant Δ > 0, whose only positive solution 
is 
 
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
=
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
2
+
√(1 − 𝛼)2(1 − 𝜏)2𝐴2ℎ𝐿
2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
+ 4𝜏
(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)ℎ𝐿 
𝛼 𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
2
. 
(A22) 
      In the following, we also determine another recurrence satisfied by the capital in efficiency units. 
To this aim, first we have to find expressions for the savings 𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺. Using Eq. (A18) and (14), 
we can simplify the expression of 𝛺𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 and determine the expression of  
𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 as follows. 
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𝛺𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)𝐴𝛼(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼−1
=
𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝐴𝛼(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼−1
=
𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝐴𝛼(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼−1
=
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝐴𝛼(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
. 
(A23) 
 𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = 𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝛺𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
= 𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝐴𝛼(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
= 𝜏𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝐴𝛼(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
= 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 . 
(A24) 
      Hence, using Eq. (7) and (A20), one obtains the following expressions for 𝑠𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 and 
𝑠𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺. 
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𝑠𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2𝐴2(1 − 𝛼)2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
ℎ𝐿2
1 + 𝛽
+
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
ℎ𝐿2𝜏
(1 + 𝛽)
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1
+ 𝜌𝑡+1)
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 −
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2𝐴2(1 − 𝛼)2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
ℎ𝐿2
2(1 + 𝛽)
−
𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)
(1 − 𝛼)2𝜏2ℎ𝐿2(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
𝛼2
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)2 (
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
−
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
ℎ𝐿2𝜏
(1 + 𝛽)
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1
+ 𝜌𝑡+1)
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
−
𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
1 + 𝛽
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2𝐴2(1 − 𝛼)2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
ℎ𝐿2
2(1 + 𝛽)
−
𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)
(1 − 𝛼)2𝜏2ℎ𝐿2(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
𝛼2
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)2 (
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
−
𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
1 + 𝛽
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺, 
(A25) 
 
𝑠𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2𝐴2(1 − 𝛼)2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
ℎ𝐻2
2(1 + 𝛽)
−
𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)
(1 − 𝛼)2𝜏2ℎ𝐻2 (𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
𝛼2
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)2 (
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
−
𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)ℎ𝐻2 𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
ℎ𝐿(1 + 𝛽)
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺. 
(A26) 
      Combining Eq. (A25) and (A26), one gets 
 31 
 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝑁𝑡
2
∑ 𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑖=𝐿,𝐻
=
𝑁𝑡
2(1 + 𝛽)
[𝛽(1 − 𝜏)2𝐴2(1 − 𝛼)2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼 ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2
2
−
𝛽
2
(1 − 𝛼)2𝜏2(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
𝛼2
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)2 (
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 )
− 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 ℎ𝐿
2 + ℎ𝐻2
ℎ𝐿
] . 
(A27) 
      Then, one obtains 
 𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = 𝑁𝑡+1
2
(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺) = 𝑁𝑡
2
 (1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
ℎ𝐿
2+ℎ𝐻
2
ℎ𝐿
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺, (A28) 
 
𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
=
1
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 [𝐴
2𝛽(1 − 𝛼)2(1
− 𝜏)2ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
−
𝛽𝜏2(1 − 𝛼)2(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)2ℎ𝐿
𝛼2
(
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
−
2𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 ]. 
(A29) 
      In the following, we also show how one can express 𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺  as a function of 𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 . 
Starting from Eq. (A21), one obtains 
 𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺(𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺−(1−𝛼)(1−𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
 )
(1−𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1+𝜌𝑡+1)
, (A30) 
      which requires 
 𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 ≥ (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
, (A31) 
      to guarantee the non-negativity of 𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 . Then, using also Eq. (A29), one obtains 
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2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 (𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
 )
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼 (1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
= 𝐴2𝛽(1 − 𝛼)2(1 − 𝜏)2ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
−
𝛽𝜏2(1 − 𝛼)2(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)2ℎ𝐿
𝛼2
(𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
 (𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
 )
2
(1 − 𝛼)2𝜏2ℎ𝐿
2(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
𝛼2 (1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
2
(𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2  (𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2
−
2𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
 
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 (𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
 )
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼 (1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
, 
(A32) 
      hence 
 
2𝛼(1 + 𝛽)𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 (𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
)
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿
= 𝐴2𝛽(1 − 𝛼)2(1 − 𝜏)2ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
−
𝛽 (𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
)
2
ℎ𝐿
−
2 𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 (𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
)
ℎ𝐿 
. 
(A33) 
      After some simplifications, this reduces to 
 
2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏
= 𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼.  (A34) 
      Concluding, one can express 𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 as a function of 𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 as follows. 
 𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
[𝛽𝜏(1−𝛼)+2𝛼(1+𝛽)+𝜏(1−𝛼)(2+𝛽)](1−𝛼)(1−𝜏)𝐴 ℎ𝐿
2𝛼(1+𝛽)+𝜏(1−𝛼)(2+𝛽)
(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
, (A35) 
      which also satisfies Eq. (A31). Then, using Eq. (A18), one obtains 
 
𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
=
[𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴 ℎ𝐻
2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
. 
(A36) 
      From Eq. (A35), one gets 
 
𝑙𝐿,𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼, (A37) 
      which, combined with (A20) and (A35), provides 
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[𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴 ℎ𝐿
2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
= (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)𝐴ℎ𝐿(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
+
(1 − 𝛼)𝜏ℎ𝐿𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝛼
(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼
(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼. 
(A38) 
      Then, after some simplifications, one obtains 
 𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
]
1
1+𝛼
   (𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
1+𝛼. (A39) 
      Summarizing the analysis above, one obtains the following for the Bismarckian PAYG case. 
 
Relationship between the labor supply choices of the low-skilled and high-skilled individuals: 
 𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 =
ℎ𝐻
ℎ𝐿
𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺. (A40) 
Recursive formula for the capital in efficiency units: 
 𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
]
1
1+𝛼
   (𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
1+𝛼.   (A41) 
Unique nontrivial steady state solution (when 𝜌𝑡 = 𝜌):  
 𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽(1−𝛼)(1−𝜏)
[2𝛼(1+𝛽)+𝜏(1−𝛼)(2+𝛽)](1+𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼. (A42) 
 
𝑙𝐿
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = (1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)
𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
 
×  [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼
ℎ𝐿. 
(A43) 
 
𝑙𝐻
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺 = (1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)
𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
 
× [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼
ℎ𝐻. 
(A44) 
 
𝐾𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝑁𝑡
=
ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2
2
(1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)
𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽) 
2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
 
× [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼
. 
(A45) 
 
 34 
Beveridgean FF System 
 
      Combining Eq. (8) and (16), and taking into account that in a Beveridgean payment scheme - 
the labor supply decisions of the other individuals being the same - the labor supply decision of a 
single individual does not practically influence his future pension, one obtains 
 𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖. (A46) 
      This, combined with Eq. (7) and (16) again, provides 
 
𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 −
𝛽(𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
2 −
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
1 + 𝛽
. 
(A47) 
 
      Then, using Eq. (25), (22), and (23), one gets 
 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 =
𝑁𝑡
2
∑ (𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 + 𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
𝑖=𝐿,𝐻
=
𝑁𝑡
2
[
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
1 + 𝛽
+
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
1 + 𝛽
−
𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
1 + 𝛽
−
𝛽(𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
2(1 + 𝛽)
−
𝛽(𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
2(1 + 𝛽)
+
(1 + 𝛽)𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
1 + 𝛽
]
=
𝛽𝑁𝑡𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2(1 + 𝛽)
−
𝛽𝑁𝑡 ((𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
+ (𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
)
4(1 + 𝛽)
, 
(A48) 
 
𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 = 𝑁𝑡+1
2
 𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 ), (A49) 
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𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 =
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
=
𝛽𝑁𝑡𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(ℎ𝐿𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 + ℎ𝐻𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2(1 + 𝛽)
𝑁𝑡+1
2  𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ𝐿
2 + ℎ𝐻
2 )
−
𝛽𝑁𝑡 ((𝑙𝐿,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
+ (𝑙𝐻,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
)
4(1 + 𝛽)
𝑁𝑡+1
2 𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ𝐿
2 + ℎ𝐻
2 )
=
𝛽𝑁𝑡(1 − 𝜏)(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 )
2(1 + 𝛽)
𝑁𝑡+1
2  𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ𝐿
2 + ℎ𝐻
2 )
−
𝛽𝑁𝑡(1 − 𝜏)2(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 )
4(1 + 𝛽)
𝑁𝑡+1
2 𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ𝐿
2 + ℎ𝐻
2 )
=
𝛽(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 −
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
=
𝛽(1 + 𝜏)(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
=
𝛽(1 + 𝜏)𝐴2(1 − 𝛼)2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2𝛼
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
𝛼
=
𝛽(1 + 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2𝛼
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
𝛼. 
(A50) 
Recursive formula for the capital in efficiency units: 
 𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 = [
𝐴𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜏)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
]
1
1+𝛼
(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹)
2𝛼
1+𝛼. (A51) 
Unique nontrivial steady state solution (when 𝜌𝑡 = 𝜌): 
 𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 = [
𝐴𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜏)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼
. (A52) 
 𝑙𝐿
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜏)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼
ℎ𝐿. (A53) 
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 𝑙𝐻
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜏)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼
ℎ𝐻. (A54) 
 𝐾𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
𝑁𝑡
=
ℎ𝐿
2 + ℎ𝐻
2
2
(1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜏)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼
. (A55) 
 
Bismarckian FF Pension System 
 
      Combining Eq. (8) and (17), one obtains 
 𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = 𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖. (A56) 
      This, combined with Eq. (7) and (17) again, provides 
 
𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 =
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 −
𝛽(𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2
2 −
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹
1 + 𝛽
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2
ℎ𝑖
2
1 + 𝛽
−
𝛽(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2
ℎ𝑖
2
2(1 + 𝛽)
−
𝜏(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2
ℎ𝑖
2
1 + 𝛽
=
(𝛽 − 2𝜏𝛽 − 2𝜏)(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2
ℎ𝑖
2
2(1 + 𝛽)
. 
(A57) 
      Then, using Eq. (25), (22), and (23), one gets 
 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 =
𝑁𝑡
2
∑ (𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 + 𝜏𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
𝑖=𝐿,𝐻
=
𝑁𝑡
2
[
(𝛽 − 2𝜏𝛽 − 2𝜏)(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2
(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 )
2(1 + 𝛽)
+
2(1 + 𝛽)𝜏(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2
(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 )
2(1 + 𝛽)
] =
𝑁𝑡𝛽(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2
(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 )
4(1 + 𝛽)
, 
(A58) 
 
𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = 𝑁𝑡+1
2
 𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 ), (A59) 
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𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 =
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹
𝐿𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 =
𝑁𝑡𝛽(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2
(ℎ𝐿2 + ℎ𝐻2 )
4(1 + 𝛽)
𝑁𝑡+1
2  𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹(ℎ𝐿
2 + ℎ𝐻
2 )
=
𝛽(𝑤𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑤𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹
=
𝛽𝐴2(1 − 𝛼)2(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2𝛼
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
𝛼
   
=
𝛽𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2𝛼
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
𝛼
=
𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝐴(1 − 𝛼)(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
2𝛼
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)(𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺)
𝛼. 
(A60) 
Recursive formula for the capital in efficiency units: 
 𝑘𝑡+1
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = [
𝐴𝛽(1 − 𝛼)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌𝑡+1)
]
1
1+𝛼
(𝑘𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹)
2𝛼
1+𝛼. (A61) 
Unique nontrivial steady state solution (when 𝜌𝑡 = 𝜌): 
 𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = [
𝐴𝛽(1 − 𝛼)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼
. (A62) 
 𝑙𝐿
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝛽(1 − 𝛼)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼
ℎ𝐿. (A63) 
 𝑙𝐻
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝛽(1 − 𝛼)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼
ℎ𝐻. (A64) 
 𝐾𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹
𝑁𝑡
=
ℎ𝐿
2 + ℎ𝐻
2
2
𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝛽(1 − 𝛼)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)
]
1
1−𝛼
. (A65) 
 
Stability analysis 
 
      All the difference equations (A7), (A41), (A51), (A61) describing the evolution of 𝑘𝑡 for the 
four pensions systems are of the form 
 𝑘𝑡+1 = 𝐶𝑘𝑡
2 𝛼
1+𝛼, (A66) 
      where 𝐶 > 0 is a constant which depends on the pension system. As it is usual in the analysis of 
one-dimensional autonomous time-invariant dynamical systems (see, e.g., de la Croix and Michel 
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(2002), Appendix A.3), existence and local stability of steady state solutions can be investigated 
graphically, finding the intersections between the curve 
𝑘𝑡+1(𝑘𝑡) = 𝐶𝑘𝑡
2 𝛼
1+𝛼, (A67) 
      and the line 
𝑘𝑡+1(𝑘𝑡) = 𝑘𝑡, (A68) 
      and evaluating the local slope of the first curve at such intersections (see Figure A1, which 
refers to a particular choice of the parameters, which does not influence the result of the stability 
analysis). 
 
Figure A1. For 𝛼 = 0.1 and 𝐶 = 0.9763: graphical investigation of the existence of steady states 
for the dynamical system 𝑘𝑡+1 = 𝐶𝑘𝑡
2 𝛼
1+𝛼, and of their local stability. 
 
      Hence, one can see from Figure A1 that such difference equations admit the trivial steady state 
?̅?(1) = 0, and the nontrivial one ?̅?(2) = 𝐶
1+𝛼
1−𝛼. Since the slope of the first curve is infinite in the 
trivial steady state ?̅?(1)  and less than 1 in absolute value in the nontrivial steady state ?̅?(2) , we 
conclude that the trivial steady state ?̅?(1)  is unstable, whereas the nontrivial one ?̅?(2)  is locally 
asymptotically stable. Moreover, using a similar analysis as in de la Croix and Michel (2002), 
Appendix A.3 (see, in particular, Proposition A.6 in that reference and its proof), one can also prove 
that ?̅?(2) is even globally asymptotically stable (i.e., for any initial condition different from 0, 𝑘𝑡 
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tends to ?̅?(2)as 𝑡  tends to infinity). This follows from the fact that the right-hand side of each 
difference equation 𝑘𝑡+1 = 𝐶𝑘𝑡
2 𝛼
1+𝛼  is a non-negative, concave, and increasing function of 𝑘𝑡. 
 
Partial derivatives with respect to 𝜏 and 𝜌 of the steady state values of the capital in efficiency units 
and of the individual labor supply choice 
 
      In the following, we report closed-form expressions for the partial derivatives mentioned in 
Propositions 1, 2, and 3, together with their signs. 
 
𝜕𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜕𝜏
= − 
𝐴𝛼𝛽
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌) +
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)]2(1 + 𝜌)
[ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+1
< 0. (A69) 
 
𝜕𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜕𝜏
== − 
𝐴𝛼𝛽
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌) +
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)]2(1 + 𝜌)
[ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+1
< 0. (A70) 
 
𝜕𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜏
=
𝐴𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌) [𝐴𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜏)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌) ]
− 11−𝛼+1
> 0. 
(A71) 
 
𝜕𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜏
= 0. 
(A72) 
 
𝜕𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜕𝜌
= −
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)2 [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+1
< 0. 
(A73) 
 
𝜕𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜕𝜌
= −
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)2 [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+1
< 0. 
(A74) 
 
𝜕𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜌
= −
𝐴𝛽(1 + 𝜏)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)2 [𝐴𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜏)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌) ]
− 11−𝛼+1
< 0. 
(A75) 
 
𝜕𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜌
= −
𝐴𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)2 [ 𝐴𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+1
< 0. 
(A76) 
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𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜕𝜏
= − 𝐴(1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼
ℎ𝑖
−
𝐴𝛼 [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌) +
𝐴𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)2(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)]2(1 + 𝜌)] (1 − 𝜏)
[ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+2
ℎ𝑖 < 0. 
(A77) 
 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜕𝜏
= − 
𝐴2𝛼2𝛽(1 − 𝛼)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌) (1 − 𝜏)[𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼)]
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)] [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+2
ℎ𝑖 
− 
𝐴2𝛼2𝛽(1 − 𝛼)2(2 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)]2(1 + 𝜌) (1 − 𝜏)[𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼)]
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)] [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+2
ℎ𝑖
+ 
𝐴 [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)]
𝛼
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)[𝛽(1 − 𝛼) + (1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 − 𝜏)
2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
ℎ𝑖
−
𝐴 [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)]
𝛼
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)2(2 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝜏)[𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼)]
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)]2
ℎ𝑖
−
𝐴 [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)]
𝛼
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)[𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼)]
2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)
ℎ𝑖 
(the sign is parameter dependent). 
(A78) 
 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜏
= −𝐴 [𝐴𝛽
(1−𝛼)(1+𝜏)
2(1+𝛽)(1+𝜌)
]
𝛼
1−𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)ℎ𝑖 +
𝐴2𝛼𝛽(1−𝛼)(1−𝜏)
2(1+𝛽)(1+𝜌)[𝐴𝛽
(1−𝛼)(1+𝜏)
2(1+𝛽)(1+𝜌)
]
− 11−𝛼+2
ℎ𝑖  
(the sign is parameter dependent).  
(A79) 
 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜏
= 0. 
(A80) 
 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜕𝜌
= −
𝐴2𝛼2𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)2
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)2 [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
2[𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)](1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+2
ℎ𝑖 < 0. 
(A81) 
 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐺
𝜕𝜌
= −
𝐴2𝛼2𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)2[𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽) + 2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝛽𝜏(1 − 𝛼)]
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)]2(1 + 𝜌)2 [ 𝐴𝛼𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)
[2𝛼(1 + 𝛽) + 𝜏(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝛽)](1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+2
ℎ𝑖 < 0. 
(A82) 
 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑒𝑣,𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜌
= −
𝐴2𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏)(1 + 𝜏)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)2 [𝐴𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝜏)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌) ]
− 11−𝛼+2
ℎ𝑖 < 0. (A83) 
 
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝑠,𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜌
= −
𝐴2𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝛼)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)2 [ 𝐴𝛽
(1 − 𝛼)
2(1 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝜌)]
− 11−𝛼+2
ℎ𝑖 < 0. (A84) 
 
